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A BEHAVIORAL TWO-SEX MARRIAGE MODEL1 
                                                            by 
           John K. Dagsvik, Ane S. Flaatten and Helge Brunborg 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
In this paper we propose a particular marriage model, i.e., a model for the number of marriages 
for each age combination as a function of the vectors of the number of single men and women in 
each age group. The model is based on Dagsvik (2000) where it is demonstrated that a general 
type of matching behavior imply, under specific assumptions about the distribution of the 
preferences of the women and men, a convenient expression for the corresponding marriage 
model. 
 Data from the Norwegian Population Register for nine years are applied to estimate the 
model. We subsequently test the hypothesis that, apart from a random “noise” component, the 
age-specific parameters change over time according to a common trend. We find that the 
hypothesis is not rejected by our data. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we discuss a particular approach to the modeling of marriage behavior, and we 
estimate an empirical version of this model from annual files of data on marriages in Norway. 
 
The classical stable population models rests on a one-sex theory represented by age-specific 
fertility and death rates for the female population. It is, however, recognized that when there are 
substantial differences between the female and the male population, the one-sex models may 
lead to quite unrealistic predictions, see for example Pollak (1990), and Kuczynski (1932, pp. 
36-38). Kuczynski pointed out that since more than 50 per cent of the newborns are boys, 
predictions based on the male population may imply an increasing population while the opposite 
may be the case for one-sex models based on the female population.  
 
The two-sex problem was already discussed by Lotka (1922). Several researchers have 
proposed different types of theories based on two-sex marriage models, that is, models that yield 
the number of marriages of each possible age combination as a function of the number of 
unmarried females and males, in each age group. These contributions include Fredrickson 
(1971), Keyfitz (1971), Feeney (1972), McFarland (1972), Das Gupta (1973), Pollard (1977), 
Schoen (1977, 1981), Keilman (1985), Pollard and Höhn (1993). 
 
Although these authors have made seminal contributions to the literature on two-sex marriage 
models, the proposed models are nonetheless unsatisfactory from a behavioral point of view 
since they are not derived from a theory of individual behavior. Without such a theory, it is 
difficult to give a precise interpretation of key concepts and parameters in the marriage model. 
In other words, the models are ad hoc from a theoretical perspective. 
 
  
  
The analysis in this paper is based on a two-sex marriage model that is derived from a theory of 
two-sided matching. The point of departure is the theoretic analysis of marriage markets 
summarized in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). The literature on matching behavior does not, 
however, consider the aggregation problem of predicting the number of matches of each type as 
a function of the number of agents of each type and parameters that represent the corresponding 
distribution of preferences. This aggregation problem was analyzed by Dagsvik (2000) who 
derived a particular aggregate matching model from assumptions about the distribution of 
preferences of the agents in the market and assumptions about the rules of the matching 
behavior. The model proposed by Dagsvik (2000) offers therefore the possibility of establishing 
a behavioral two-sex marriage model. 
 
While the discussion in Dagsvik (2000) was intended to apply to different types of matching 
markets, the focus in this paper is on empirical modeling and estimation of a two-sex marriage 
model based on Dagsvik's framework. The empirical analysis is based on population register 
data from Statistics Norway for the years 1985 to 1994. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we outline the theoretical point of departure and 
the structure of the (aggregate) marriage model. In Section 3 qualitative properties of the model 
are addressed, and in Section 4 a particular extension of the model is discussed. Section 5 
describes the data, and in the last section we report the empirical results. 
 
2. A BEHAVIORAL TWO-SEX MODEL 
In this section we outline the key elements of a behavioral theory for the marriage market and 
the implied two-sex model. For a more detailed analysis including proofs we refer to Dagsvik 
(2000). 
 
  
  
As mentioned above, our theory is based on a particular two-sided matching setting which has 
been extensively analyzed by numerous authors, and discussed in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). 
We shall now describe a particular matching algorithm called the “deferred acceptance” 
algorithm, which is an explicit example of a particular type of matching behavior. 
 
Consider a population of men and women who are looking for a partner to form a match 
(marriage). Each man and each woman are supposed to have sufficient information about the 
population of the opposite sex so as to be able to establish preference lists, i.e., lists of rankings 
of all potential partners, including the alternative of being single. The matching process towards 
equilibrium takes place in several stages. There are no search costs and the agents have no 
information about the preferences of potential partners, which means that they are ignorant 
about their “chances” in the market. The deferred acceptance algorithm goes as follows: Either 
the women or the men make offers, that is, if the men make the offers no woman is allowed to 
make offers. 
 
Let us first introduce some basic terminology. The following concepts are borrowed from Roth 
and Sotomayor (1990). 
 
A man is acceptable to a woman if the woman prefers to be married (matched) to the man rather 
than staying single. Consider a matching denoted by μ that matches a pair (m,f) who are not 
mutually acceptable. Then at least one of the agents would prefer to be single rather than being 
matched to the other. Such a matching μ is said to be blocked by the unhappy agent. Consider 
next a matching μ such that there exist a man m and a woman f who are matched to one another, 
but who prefer each other to their assignment at μ (given the rules of the game). The pair (m,f) 
is said to block the matching μ. We say that a matching μ is stable if it is not blocked by any 
individual or pair of agents. 
  
  
 
Gale and Shapley (see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)) have demonstrated that stable matchings 
exist for every matching market. Specifically they prove that the “deferred acceptance” 
procedure produces a stable matching for any set of preferences, provided the preferences are 
strict, i.e., that indifference is ruled out. The algorithm goes as follows: Suppose the men make 
the offers. First each man makes an offer to his favorite woman. Each woman rejects the offer 
from any man who is unacceptable to her, and each woman who receives more than one offer 
from any man rejects all but her most preferred among these. Any man whose offer is not 
rejected at this point is kept temporarily “engaged” until better offers arrive. At any step any 
man who was rejected at the previous step makes an offer to his next choice i.e., to his most 
preferred woman among those who have not rejected him. Each woman receiving offers rejects 
any from unacceptable men, and also rejects all but her most preferred among the group of the 
new offers and any man she may have kept engaged from the previous step. There are no 
“costs” associated with the temporary “engagements”. The algorithm stops after any step in 
which no man is rejected. (The final stage.) The matches are now consummated with each man 
being married to the woman he is engaged. 
 
The stability argument goes as follows: Suppose that man m and woman f are not matched to 
each other, but m prefers f to his partner. Then woman f must be acceptable to man m, and so he 
must have made an offer to f before making an offer to his current partner. Since m was not 
engaged to f when the algorithm stopped, m must have been rejected by f in favor of someone 
she (f) liked more. Therefore, f is matched to a man whom f likes more than man m, and so m 
and f do not block the matching. Since the matching is not blocked by any individual or any 
pair, it is stable. Similarly one could apply a rule where the women make offers to the men. 
However, this would not necessarily produce a matching that is equal to the former one. 
 
  
  
As discussed in Dagsvik (2000), the aggregate marriage model which will be outlined below is 
consistent with any matching algorithm⎯be it this deferred acceptance algorithm or 
not⎯provided the matching is stable.1 
 
Next we shall introduce some concepts and notations which will enable us to describe formally 
the marriage model. We assume that the preferences of the individuals are represented by latent 
utility indexes. Let Fi be the number of single women in age group i and Mj the number of 
single men in age group j, i S   Let U  be the utility of female f in age 
group i of being married to man m in age group j, and let  be the utility of female f in age 
group i of being single. Let  be the utility of man m in age group j of being married to 
female f in age group i, and let  be the corresponding utility of being single. We assume that 
the utilities have the following structure 
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where  are positive deterministic terms, while { }  are 
positive i.i.d. random variables (taste-shifters) with cumulative distribution function 
{ } { }a bij ji, { } { } {ε ε η ηijfm if jimf jmand, ,0 0 }
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for . Note that since we are only concerned with preference orderings we can take any 
increasing transformation of the utilities without altering the rank orderings. For example, if we 
take the logarithm of the utilities we get an (equivalent) additive formulation instead of the 
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multiplicative one above, and the corresponding cumulative distribution function of the error 
terms will have the form  The justification for this particular distribution function 
can be found in the theory of random utility models for discrete choice, see for example 
McFadden (1984). 
( )exp .− −e y


 
Before we state the implications of the assumptions above, it may be instructive to outline a 
somewhat informal argument to provide the intuition behind the basic idea that underlies the 
model. To this end we ignore the fact that the sets of available partners to a specific individual 
at each stage in the adjustment process will vary across the population due to the effect of the 
random taste-shifters. Moreover, we only discuss the simple setting in which there are no age 
groups, which means that all men, as well as women, are observationally identical. 
 
Let Cf be the set of men that are available to woman f in the final stage of the game, and let n be 
the (mean) number of men in Cf. Let r be the (mean) number of women that are available to man 
m in the final stage of the game. Since there are F women, the probability that a woman shall 
prefer to be married to man m equals r/F. But this probability can also be expressed as 
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The probability statement above means the probability that man m yields the highest utility to 
woman f, among all feasible men and the utility of being matched to man m is also higher than 
the utility of being single. From the above distributional assumption it follows from standard 
results in discrete choice theory, cf. for example McFadden (1984), that 
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where α =1 a .  But this probability is also equal to r/F. Consequently, the following equation 
must be true 
 
 r
F n
=
+
1
α
. (2.1) 
 
By symmetry we also must have that 
 
 n
M r
=
+
1
β  (2.2) 
 
where β =1 b.  It is easily verified that these equations determine r and n uniquely. Consider 
next the probability that a woman and a man shall marry. Since the probability that a woman 
makes an offer to a particular man equals r/F, and there are n available men to this woman the 
probability that the woman shall marry any of the men available to her must be equal to n r F⋅ .  
Since F is the number of women the number of marriages, X (say), is therefore equal to r n⋅ .  
When equations (2.1) and (2.2) are solved for r and n we find that X satisfies the equation 
 
 . (2.3) ( ) ( )F X M X X− − = αβ
 
This equation has only one acceptable solution which is equal to 
 
 ( )X M F M F M= + + − + + − 
1
2
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From (2.3) we realize that α and β are not separately identified, only the product αβ can be 
identified given F, M and X. The intuitive and informal derivation above ignores the fact that 
the women's and the men’s choice sets are stochastic in that they depend on all the random error 
terms in the utility functions. For a more rigorous treatment, where the stochastic dependencies 
between the different choice sets are taken into account, we refer to Dagsvik (2000). 
 
Let us next return to the general case. By using analogous arguments to the ones used in the 
case with observationally identical men and women considered above, it is possible to derive a 
convenient expression for the number of marriages in the case where the women and men are 
characterized by age. Let Xij be the number of marriages where the wife has age i and the 
husband has age j. Let  be the number of women of age i that remain single and  the 
number of men of age j that remain single. Dagsvik (2000) has demonstrated that 
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X i
f
0 X j
m
0
X X and Xij i
f
j
m, 0 0
 
 X
F M c
A Bij
i j ij
i j
= ,  (2.5) 
 
 X
F
Ai
f i
i
0 =  (2.6) 
 
and 
 
 X
M
Bj
m j
j
0 = ,  (2.7) 
 
where  and {  and {  are uniquely determined by the system of equations ij ij jic a b≡ , }A i }Bj
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Unfortunately, the solution of (2.8) and (2.9) cannot be expressed in closed form. However, we 
realize from (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) that we can express the preference parameters  as { }cij
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X
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This expression is very convenient because it allows us to recover the structural parameters 
 from data on the number of marriages and the number of unmarried men and women in a 
very simple way. If the population is large (2.10) will provide precise estimates of { } . 
Similarly to the simple case considered above we realize that {  and {  cannot be 
separately identified unless further structure on the preferences is imposed. 
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3. QUALITATIVE PROPERTIES OF THE MARRIAGE MODEL 
Let us next discuss some additional qualitative properties of the marriage function, i.e., the 
number of marriages Xij as a function of the population vectors of single men and women. 
  
  
McFarland (1972) has proposed seven axioms which a marriage model should satisfy. To 
describe these axioms, let now Xij(F,M) denote the marriage function where F and M are the 
vectors of the number of single women and men in the respective age groups. The axioms are as 
follows: 
 
A1. Xij(F,M) should be defined for all vectors F and M whose elements are non-negative 
integers. 
A2. Xij(F,M) must be non-negative. 
A3.  and . 
j ij i
X F =( , )F M i ij jX M =( , )F M
A4. The number of marriages should depend heavily on the ages of the males and females. 
A5. Xij(F,M) should be a non-decreasing function of Fi and Mj, and be strictly increasing for 
some values of Fi and Mj. 
A6. Xij(F,M) should be a non-increasing (and over some interval a strictly decreasing function) 
of Fr and Ms for r i≠  and s j≠ . 
A7. The negative effect on Xij(F,M) of an increase in Ms should be greater than the negative 
effect on Xij(F,M) of an equivalent increase in Mr if s is closer to j than r is. Likewise with 
the sexes interchanged. 
 
The most important of these axioms are A5 to A7. Axiom A7 requires that a metric is 
introduced. A natural metric is to define s as closer to i than r (for men of age j) if 
 
 b b b bjs ji jr ji− > − ,  
 
  
  
i.e. the distances are expressed as the difference between the respective structural terms of the 
preferences. 
 
We shall now demonstrate that our marriage model does not satisfy all axioms above unless 
further assumptions about the preferences are imposed. Unfortunately, we have not been able to 
prove whether or not A5 and A7 hold. In some cases, A6 does not hold. Given the sizes of the 
age-specific population groups of unmarried females and males and the parameter estimates of 
 reported in Section 6 we have checked whether or not A5, A6 and A7 are violated. This is 
done by successively increasing the sizes of the female and male age groups, from the 
respective observed levels of {  and { . In the period 1985-1994 we did not find any case 
where A5, A6 and A7 was violated.  
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We shall next discuss a particular case, where  and , i.e., the deterministic 
components of the agent’s utility function do not depend on his age, and demonstrate that in this 
case A6 does not hold. From (2.8) and (2.9) we obtain that 
a aij j= b bji i=
 
  (3.1) A b K B ai i j j= + = +1 11 ,
 
where K1 and K2 are determined by 
 
 K
M a
B
M
Kk
k k
k
k
k
k
1
2
= =
+  α ,  (3.2) 
 
 K
F b
A
F
Kk
k k
k
k
k
k
2
1
= =
+  β  (3.3) 
 
  
  
and α j a=1 j  and β i b=1 i . From (2.5) we get that 
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By implicit differentiation, (3.2) and (3.3) yield 
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According to McFarland, ∂ ∂log X Mij r  should be nonpositive which would be true provided 
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It is straight forward to demonstrate that there exists a  such that ( )β β* min , max∈ k k k kβ
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Suppose that β  and that αj is close to zero. Then, evidently βi ≥ *
 
( )
α
β
β
β
βj
i iK
K K
K
K
K
K
+ −
+
+
≈ −
+
+



 <2
1 2
1
2
1
1
1 0* * .  
 
Thus if ja 1≡ α j  is sufficiently large and i ib 1≡ β  is sufficiently small then Xij will increase 
when Mr increases, which means that axiom A6 is violated. The intuition here is as follows: If 
more men become available the demand from women of age i for men of age j is in general 
likely to decrease. Similarly the demand for women of age i from men of age j is likely to 
  
  
increase since the competition becomes harder when new men enter. However, since demand 
from men of age r for women of ages other than age i is high compared to the demand for 
women of age i, this implies that new men of age r who enter the market will increase the 
demand pressure towards women of other ages than i. Similarly, women of other ages than i will 
have lower preferences for men of age j than for men of age r when aj is sufficiently high. 
Consequently, the competition for men of age j the women of age i are facing, will in this case 
decrease because women of other ages tend to prefer new men of age r. Similarly, new men of 
age r will tend to fancy women of other ages than i, which thus reduces the competition for 
women of age i facing men of age j. Accordingly, Xij will increase when new men of age r enter 
the market. 
 
In the appendix we derive analytic expressions for the elasticities of Xij,  and  with 
respect to Fi and Mj for all i and j. 
Xi
f
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4. AN EXTENSION OF THE MODEL 
In this section we shall describe a particular extension of the model discussed above. 
Specifically, we shall now allow some of the random error terms to be correlated. As above we 
only give a brief summary here; for more precise details we refer to Dagsvik (2000). We define 
 by [ ]θ1 0 1∈ ,
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for  The motivation for this correlation is that there may be unobservable factors affecting 
the utility for potential partners, which are correlated across potential partners. These 
correlations are the only ones that are allowed to be different from zero, i.e. 
s f≠ .
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for all f, m, p, q, i, j, k and r. Dagsvik (2000) demonstrates that the marriage model in this case 
turns out to have the structure 
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for  and  For the purpose of estimation it is convenient that we can 
express the preference parameters as 
i S= 1 2, , ... , , j D= 1 2, , ..., .
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where ~c a bij ij ji=
θ θ θ θ2 1 . Similarly to the model considered in Section 2 we cannot identify aij and 
bji separately. However, with data for several periods it is possible to identify θ θ1  and θ θ2 . 
 
5. DATA 
The data come from the annual files of marriages at Statistics Norway, which are obtained from 
the Central Population Register for Norway and based on the personal identification numbers 
introduced in Norway in 1964. A number of variables are available for each new marriage, such 
  
  
as date of birth of the spouses, date of marriage, marriage number (1st, 2nd, etc.), previous 
marital status (single, divorced, widow(er)ed) and citizenship. In this preliminary/first analysis 
we have included all non-married persons who were residents of Norway at the time of 
marriage, to secure consistency between flows (marriages) and stocks (marriageable persons). 
From these files we have constructed marriage matrices by age at the end of the year, to make 
stocks and flows refer to the same birth cohorts. For the stock of potential marriage partners we 
use the number of non-married men and women, respectively, implicitly assuming that never 
married and previously married have the same preferences, and vice versa, that they are equally 
attractive in the marriage market, (which is probably not quite true in practice). As our model 
assumes that the population is closed, i.e. there being no deaths, immigrations and emigrations, 
we use the mean population of non-married persons at the beginning and end of the year as 
estimates of the number of non-married men and women in each age group, respectively, to 
adjust for actual deaths and migrations.2 
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As regards estimation results for the preference parameters { }ijtc  based on (2.10) for all the 
years from 1985 to 1994 we refer to Dagsvik et al. (1998). Here, t indexes year. 
 
On the basis of these results we have tested an implication of a particular hypothesis which we 
shall explain below. To this end let {  and  denote the preference matrix in year t. 
Consider the hypothesis 
}a ijt { }b jit
 
  (6.1) a h q tijt ij= 1 1 ( ),
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where hij1 and hij2 are parameters that are constant over time. The equations (6.1) and (6.2) mean 
that, apart from the noise implied by the random error terms, the preferences for potential 
partners will not change over time as long as the option to remain single is ruled out. This 
follows from the fact that 
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since the factor q1(t) cancels in utility comparisons. Thus q1(t) and q2(t) only affect the 
propensity to marry. 
 
In the following we shall test a slightly weaker hypothesis. Without loss of generality we may 
write 
 
 log c mijt ij t ijt= + +γ η  (6.3) 
 
where  are constants that do not depend on t while {  are constants that do not depend 
on i and j. The terms  are random variables with zero mean. Note that when , (6.3) 
is implied by (6.1) and (6.2) with  and 
{ }γ ij }mt
t( )
{ }ηijt ηijt = 0
m q t qt = +log ( ) log1 2 γ ij ij= +log log ijh h1 2 . 
 
  
  
We wish to test the hypothesis H0 that the random variables {  are i.i.d. against the 
alternative that  are independent random variables with zero mean and 
with a distribution which may depend on t. For this purpose the T-sample analogue to the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov or, alternatively, Cramér-von Mises test procedure can be used. To this 
end let 
}ηijt
ηijt i j, , , ... , , , ... ,= =1 2 1 2
 
 Z
X
X Xijt
ijt
i t
f
j t
m=





log .
0 0
 (6.4) 
 
Recall that by (2.10), Zijt is a “natural” estimator of . Without loss of generality we can 
normalize so that the mean of {  (over time) is equal to zero. Hence, under the assumption 
that {  have zero mean across time as well as across all age combinations (i,j), it follows 
that {  can be estimated as 
log cijt
}mt
}
}
ηijt
ηijt
 
 ijt ijt ij tˆ Z Z Z Z⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅⋅⋅η = − − +  (6.5) 
 
where Z Z and Zij t⋅ ⋅⋅ ⋅⋅⋅,  are the respective means over time, age combinations, and combinations 
of age and time. The estimator (6.5) follows from the least squares procedure. To avoid 
estimation errors due to the limited number of marriages in certain age combinations, 
particularly for large age differences, we have only used data with − ≤ . − ≤3 7j i
 
Consider next the test procedures. Let  be the cumulative empirical distribution of  in 
year t, and let Ft(y) be the corresponding theoretical cumulative distribution function. Let nt be 
 ( )F yt ijtηˆ
  
  
the number of observations in year t, i.e., nt is the number of combinations (i,j) given the 
constraints above. Finally, let ~( )F y  be the mean empirical distribution over all years, i.e., 
 
 ~( )  ( )F y n
n
F y
t
T
t
t=
=

1
 (6.6) 
 
where T is the number of years for which we have observations of marriages, and 
 
  n n
t
T
t=
=

1
.
 
Define 
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and 
 
  (6.8) ( )n F y F y dF y
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2
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The statistics Q1(T) and Q2(T) are known, respective as the T-sample analogue to the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, and the Cramér-von Mises statistics, which provide two alternative test 
statistics for testing H0, where H0 now can be formulated as 
 
  H F F FT0 1 2: .= = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
  
  
 
Kiefer (1959) has derived the asymptotic distributions of Q1 and Q2 and he has provided tables 
of critical values for . In our data set , which we assume is sufficiently large to 
allow us to apply asymptotic test criteria. In the case with T  the five per cent critical value 
for Q1(6) is equal to 2.00, and for Q2(6) it is equal to 1.47. In our case , but since it 
follows from (6.7) and (6.8) that Q1(T) and Q2(T) are increasing in T, the respective five per 
cent critical values for Q1(9) and Q2(9) are larger than the ones for Q1(6) and Q2(6). Our data 
yields Q  and . We can therefore conclude that neither the test based on 
Q1(9) nor the one based on Q2(9) imply that H0 is rejected. 
T ≤ 6
1 Q2
n t = 131
= 6
T = 9
1 9 18( ) .= 9 138( ) .=
 
Our next concern is the distribution of { }ijtηˆ . In Figure 1 we display the QQ normal plot3 of 
, where . This plot suggests that the normal distribution provides a fairly 
good representation of the distribution of { . The corresponding Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistics for a test of the hypothesis that F is a normal distribution equals 0.030. With , 
the 5 per cent critical level is 0.039, which implies that the hypothesis is not rejected. Figures 2 
and 3 display the empirical density and cumulative distribution together with the estimated 
normal density and cumulative distribution, respectively. In Table 1 we report the estimates of 
 and { . The mean and the standard deviation of  are estimated to 1.002 and 
0.064, respectively. 
{ }ηijt*
{ }γ ij
*
ijt ijtˆexpη = η
}t
}tηij*
n = 1179
m { }ηijt*
 
Thus, the data suggest that  are approximately normally distributed. It is interesting that 
one can in fact provide theoretical arguments that support the hypothesis that 
{ }cijt
{ }*ijtη  are 
Gaussian random variables. These arguments stem from the property that the behavioral model 
discussed above is in fact derived from a matching model in which men and women in addition 
  
  
to having preferences over potential partners also have preferences over a set of available 
“contracts”, cf. Dagsvik (2000), pp. 36-37. By a contract we understand terms of an agreement 
between wife and husband. In the present context it seems reasonable to assume that contracts 
are associated with the couples' social, demographic, cultural and economic choice opportunities 
related to residential location, lifestyle, type of housing, number of children, etc. The men and 
the women are assumed to behave so as to maximize utility with respect to the feasible contracts 
and partners.  
 
Let , index the contract possibilities, and analogous to the exposition in Section 2 let 
aijt(w) and bjit(w) be the respective structural terms of the utility functions of the women and the 
men at time t. Let . The corresponding matching model analysed in 
Dagsvik (2000) is a direct extension of the one presented in Section 2, and it yields a model for 
Xijt(w), where Xijt(w) is the number of (i,j) marriages at time t with for which the contract is 
equal to w. In Dagsvik (2000) it is demonstrated that the total number of marriages, 
, depends on the preference parameters {  through {  where 
w = 1 2, ,...
X
w ijt
≡
c w a w b wijt ijt jit( ) ( ) ( )=
X w)ijt ( }
w
c wijt ( ) }cijt
 
 c cijt
w
ijt= ( ) .  
 
Thus cijt may be interpreted as the sum of a large set of random variables, { . Under 
rather general assumptions about the dependence structure between these variables the Central 
Limit Theorem applies, which implies that cij is approximately normally distributed. Recall that 
the classical Central Limit Theorem requires the variances of the original variables be bounded. 
In the more general case with unbounded variances there also exists a Central Limit Theorem 
which yields the class of Stable distributions, see for example Lamperti (1996). Recall that the 
class of Stable distributions is characterized by four parameters, namely  , 
}c wijt ( )
( ]α ∈ 0 2, , σ > 0
  
  
[β ∈ −11, ]
}
 and μ, where α may be interpreted as a measure of how heavy the tail of the 
distribution is, σ is a scale parameter, β represents skewness and μ is a location parameter. 
When α = , we obtain the normal distribution in which case β vanishes. Now provided one 
finds the theoretical arguments above convincing and assume that cijt is a Stable variable, then 
data suggest that the hypothesis of normality may not be true. We have applied a method 
suggested by McCulloch (1986) to estimate α4. Specifically, we obtained the estimate,  
with asymptotic standard deviation equal to 0.09. This means that α seems to be significantly 
less than 2. The data indicate that if we test the hypothesis that {  are normally distributed 
against the alternative that they are generated from a Stable distribution, then the hypothesis will 
be rejected. Thus, we conclude that when the class of Stable distributions is postulated apriori 
the distribution of  seems to be non-normal, which implies that the right tail is 
(asymptotically) Pareto distributed. 
2
 .α = 175
ηijt*
{ }cijt
 
[Figure 1 here] 
[Table 1 here] 
[Figures 2 to 5 here] 
 
In Figure 4 we get an impression of how the parameters {  are distributed. The difference 
between the two pictures is due to the fact that the wife is usually younger than the husband. 
According to these pictures, there seems to be a strong relationship between the γ-parameters for 
different age combinations. 
}γ ij
 
In Figure 5 we have plotted the parameter mt as a function of time. We notice that mt decreases 
almost linearly from 1986 to 1994. Recall that mt may, loosely speaking, be interpreted as the 
  
  
overall preference for marrying. The decline in mt may be due to the substantial growth in 
consensual unions and an increasing age at (first) marriage. 
 
Let us finally consider the significance of the random terms { . Recall that the estimation 
result yields that 
}ηijt*
{ }*ijtη  are i.i. Stably distributed random variables. If, however, we are willing 
to assume the Gaussian approximation then we can write 
 
  ηijt ijtu* .≅ +1 0 064
 
where  are i.i. N(0,1) distributed. Since { }uijt
 
  ( ) ( ) ( )c m uijt ijt ij t ijt ij t= + = + +η γ γ* exp . exp1 0 064 m
 
the systematic term  will predict cijt apart from the multiplicative random term, 
, which with probability 0.95 will vary within (0.872, 1.128). 
( )exp γ ij tm+
1 0 064+ . u ijt
 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have discussed a particular model for two-sex marriage behavior. In contrast to 
earlier work in this field this model is derived from assumptions about the behavior of women 
and men in the marriage market. We have estimated the parameters of the model on annual 
marriage data for the years 1985-1994. We have also demonstrated that for this time period, the 
overall preference for marriage versus staying single decreases (mt declines over time). 
However, conditional on marriage, the preferences over age of the potential partners seem to 
remain unchanged throughout this period, apart from random “noise”, which is represented by a 
  
  
Stably- or alternatively a normally distributed random variable. The empirical results seem 
somewhat surprising, given the general belief of systematic changes in marriage behavior 
during this period. 
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APPENDIX 
Elasticities 
In this appendix we derive expressions for the elasticities of Xij,  and  with respect to Fi 
and Mj for all i and j. Let ∂ ∂  denote the matrices with elements 
X i
f
0 X j
m
0
∂ ∂M f F f M m F fQ Q Q and Q0 0 0, , 0
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and let Qf and Qm be the matrices with elements 
 
 Q
X
F
and Q
X
Mij
f ij
i
ij
m ji
i
= = .  
 
Then it follows readily from (2.6) to (2.9) that 
 
  (A.1) ( )∂M f f mQ I Q Q Q0 1= − − − ,f
m
m
 
  (A.2) ( )∂F f f m fQ I Q Q Q Q0 1= − − ,
 
  (A.3) ( )∂F m m fQ I Q Q Q0 1= − − −
 
and 
  
  
 
  (A.4) ( )∂M m m f mQ I Q Q Q Q0 1= − − .f
 
Note that X Fi
f
i0  and X Mj
m
j0  may be interpreted as, respectively the fraction of women of 
age i and fraction of men of age j that remain single. Consequently, the matrices may be 
interpreted as elasticities of the probability of remaining single with respect to the respective age 
group sizes of men and women. From (2.10) it follows that the elasticities of Xij can be 
computed as 
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where δjk is the Kronecker delta. Thus, to compute the elasticities we only need to know Qf and 
Qm. 
 
By using a suitable metric on the space of quadratic matrices, it is easy to show that 
 
 ( ) ( )I Q Q Q Qf m
n
f m n
− =
−
≥
1
0
0  
 
and similarly when f and m are interchanged. Consequently, (3.1) to (3.4) imply that 
 
  ∂ ∂M f F fQ Q0 00 0< >, ,
 
  ∂ ∂M m F mQ and Q0 00 0> < .
 
  
  
This means that when the number of women in some age group increases then the fraction of 
single women increases while the fraction of single men decreases. By symmetry the same 
result holds when women and men are interchanged. 
 
  
  
Footnotes 
1 Several of the modeling assumptions made above seem rather strong. Athough we are able to 
relax some of the assumptions, as will be discussed in Section 4, the assumption of for example 
no search costs can only be relaxed at the cost of analytic intractability. 
 
2 The potential number of marriage partners is not greatly affected by such changes, however, as 
the mortality is negligible in the ages with the highest marriage rates, 20-35, and the number of 
immigrants is approximately the same as the number of emigrants, although there has been an 
immigration surplus of young men in recent years. 
 
3 Recall that the QQ normal plot is obtained by plotting  where  is the 
inverse of the cumulative standard normal distribution and  is the cumulative empirical 
distribution function of the variable under study. (In this case 
(1 Gˆ(x)−Φ
Gˆ(x)
*
ijt
) 1(y)−Φ
η .) 
 
4 When estimated α we have set β = 1. This is necessary to ensure that the probability mass on 
the negative part of the real line is negligible. 
 
 
  
  
Figures 
 
Figure 1. QQ-plot of the empirical distribution of  { }η∗ijt
 
 
  
  
Figure 2. The empirical and the fitted normal density of { }  η∗ijt
 
 
Figure 3. The cumulative empirical and fitted normal distribution of { }  η∗ijt
  
  
Figure 4. Plots of  { }γ ij
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Figure 5. Plot of  from 1986 to 1994 { }m t
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